The deconstructionist Jacques Derrida, in remarking Western philosophy, comes to imply that the process of theorising ‘the self’ is one, which is conceivably marked by difference.[1] Derrida regards the self and other mental and phenomenal events as products of difference, wherein such an ‘event’ is defined by its relation to what it is not rather than its essence.[2] Derrida’s insight into the way people philosophise about the world, and subsequently about ‘the self’, is ironically and self-reflexively, unto itself, also just a philosophy. Regardless of this theoretical peccadillo, it is undoubtedly worthwhile to consider the methodologies and analytics of deconstructionism and post-structuralism when evaluating different approaches to and theories of acting. In fact, it seems very much so that the discipline of performance studies, at present, borrowing also from anthropology, psychology and sociology, has contentedly adopted this seemingly diagnostic methodology and worldview. In this way, Roach and Zarrilli, asks us to be cognizant of the (metaphorical) language, assumptions and ideologies that often permeate discourses of acting.[3] Zarrilli also, whether identifying as a ‘Deleuzian post-structuralist’ or not, notes the discrepancies that may exist between theatre/acting theory and practice; that often, the way in which theorists think of acting may not necessarily translate vis-à-vis onto practice.[4] And actors, in recognising the limitations of language in representing acting, may have no choice but to “live by” metaphors.[5]
This essay, as it’s begun to discursively do so, will explore two approaches to acting, namely Bertolt Brecht’s Epic performance and the American Method, and evaluate the ways in which they have been informed by implicit theories of the self. This exploration will make use of an array of theoretical concepts, belonging to Auslander, Appadurai, Derrida, Roach and Zarrilli, among others, to discern what is truly at stake (be it on a theoretical or a practical level) when approaches to acting are intricately and inextricably tied to a particular theory or topography of the self.
Firstly, in framing the premise of this essay, it will be instrumental to consider Auslander’s thesis. Auslander observes that theorists, as diverse as Stanislavsky, Brecht and Grotowski, “all implicitly designate the actor’s self as the logos[6] of performance; all assume that the actor’s self precedes and grounds [his] performance and that it is the presence of this self in performance that provides the audience with access to human truths.”[7] Here, Auslander is expressing this notion that in order for the spectator to derive meaning and ‘truths’ from the performance, he must be cognizant of the implicit theory of the self that the actor is seemingly embodying and presenting. Auslander further adds a remark by Chaikin for clarification: “Acting is a demonstration of self with or without a disguise,” wherein for Stanislavsky, this disguise is the actor’s own emotional experience, for Brecht, it’s the separation of the role from the actor’s own persona, and for Grotowski, it’s the divorcement from socialisation;[8] this idea that for a thorough grasp of the particular acting theory’s techniques, it necessitates an appreciation of the theorist’s underlying conception of ‘the self’. In contemplating these perspectives, Auslander discriminately arrives at his main thesis; he purports that “the self is not an autonomous foundation for acting, but [rather] is produced by the performance it supposedly grounds.”[9] Auslander clearly rejects any notion of the self as being self-evident, and suggests that the relationship between the self and the acting theory may not necessarily be one that privileges the former over the latter, but rather the two may be conceived of simultaneously; existing on equal planes. Furthermore, even if we do accept the argument that a distinct theory of the self precedes an acting approach, it does not preclude the possibility of the acting in (re)shaping and revising our theory of the self.
Appadurai also presents a convincing argument regarding the relationship between ‘the self’ and, in this instance, non-acting performance/acting. His peculiar phraseology of ‘topographies of the self’[10] implies that the theorisation of ‘the self’ is a process of survey and revision, of the content of the topography as being gleaned from historical-cultural everyday phenomenon, such as praise or any other form of linguistic interaction. And while there may be a dominant topography of the self that pervades, or underlies, a certain milieu, topographies can also vary individually – especially in this age of globalisation and multiculturalism, by the same token, this coalescence of nations and cultures may also generate an indistinct global topography of the self. Regardless, Appadurai still emphasises the utmost importance of testing topographies ethnographically.[11] He also delicately maps out a Western topography of the self, asserting that it is “anchored in a spatial image of layers … [with] the affective bedrock … directly tied to the somatic side of personality.”[12] Indeed, it will be imperative to entertain this conception of the Western ‘self’ against Brechtian and Method acting, two approaches that presumably draw from, and influence, such a ‘self’.
In addition, both Auslander’s concept of the cross-pollinating two-way street of acting/theatre and ‘the self’, and Appadurai’s argument of topographies of the self as being extractable from everyday phenomena, relate closely to Zarrilli’s thesis of “theatre-making [as] a mode of socio-cultural practice … not an innocent or naïve activity separate from or above and beyond everyday reality, history, politics, or economics.”[13] Zarrilli, in echoing the other two theorists, explains that “theatre is a complex network of specific, interactive practices … which helps to constitute, shape, and affect ‘selves’ as well as historical events and relationships.”[14] As mentioned, it is on these terms through which a consideration of Brechtian and Method acting occurs. Moreover, Zarrilli’s position of the active role that theatre plays vis-à-vis society, interestingly, reflects Brecht’s position on the matter too.
Brecht’s writing on acting is intricately linked to his overall conception of theatre. Brecht seemed to theorise about acting insofar only as it served the formation of his ‘Epic Theatre’. Brecht wanted directors together with their actors, in their (epic) theatre productions, to realise their interpretation of the play/text; however, this interpretation, as Brecht stipulated, must identify and critique the macrocosmic forces (social, historical, cultural conditions) that have shaped the characters’ relationships, lives and world.[15] His theatre’s most fundamental principle was its activist commitment to social change, and in facilitating this, it had to present society and human nature as being changeable.[16] The means by which this occurred was through interpretive examples, not by direct depictions, as Brecht explicitly wanted to draw attention to theatre’s contrived, artificial nature: “[theatre] consists of the production of living illustrations of historical or imaged occurrences between people.”[17] Brecht was against ‘illusionist theatre’ and consequently aimed to demonstrate that the concept of ‘the structure of society (represented on the stage) as capable of being influenced by society (in the auditorium)’ was both possible and ideal;[18] this resonates strongly with Zarrilli’s thesis, in that Brecht’s theatre does not play a merely passive role in society, but rather has the power to change it. Brecht’s prime concern for his Epic Theatre was to show human behaviour as alterable, of man being determined by certain political and economic factors and, more crucially, “at the same time as capable of altering them.”[19] Thus, an aspect of Brecht’s topography of the self emerges here, one that is similar to the Western version, in that it is seemingly layered; influenced by a wide set of institutional (political, economic) factors. This understanding of the self is very much in the vein of the classical Marxist tradition of ‘Dialectical Materialism’ – “the idea that the individual is created by socio-political and economic factors and is, therefore, able to change his circumstances and environment.”[20] Brecht sinisterly saw these (man-made) factors/structures as often being used by men to oppress other men, and thus will be changed by men.
Brecht devised his acting theory in the context of achieving his politicised Epic Theatre. One such technique, the Alienation Effect (‘Verfremdungseffekt’), attempted to “make the spectator adopt an attitude of inquiry and criticism in his approach to the incident[s]”[21] illustrated on stage. Thus, this acting technique served to help realise the director’s textual interpretation and, from that, the historical determinants or “dark powers” that oversaw the materialisation of the incidents.[22] The A-effect first consisted of the actor’s acknowledgement of the removal of the fourth wall, as well as ‘magic’ and ‘hypnotic tensions’.[23] In drawing attention to the artificial nature of theatre, the actor’s relationship to the audience is no longer made on the basis of empathy, rather on the basis of critical and political awareness.[24] Moreover, the focus of this acting was not on the characters themselves, but rather on what happens between them, and with this, it offers enough information for the audience to discuss, criticise and change the characters and their milieu.[25] Rouse comments that Brecht shifts the focus away from the individual and the psychological to that of the group and the sociological.[26]
The aim of the A-effect is to make the actor’s object (character’s incident) “appear strange and even surprising to the audience;”[27] to de-familiarise familiar phenomena and people so as to make spectators see them from fresh angles.[28] In this way, Brecht did not want his actors to be completely transformed nor immersed by their roles, instead to simply present their characters with distance; it is through this detachment in which the actor is in a position to both remark and invite criticism of his character.[29] Three aids, which Brecht developed to help the actor maintain this distance, are (1) transposition into the third person, (2) transposition into the past, and (3) speaking the stage directions out loud.[30] Brecht condemned Stanislavsky’s “forcing of empathy” and actor/audience identification with the character in that it “encouraged spectators to resign themselves to the status quo by presenting [people] as powerless victims of their heredity and environment;”[31] circumstances are here ‘given’ and, to that extent, are not subject to question.[32] Brecht, however, in using his theatre to demonstrate that for any given situation a large number of options are available, aspired to show that social reality is neither determined nor always defensible.[33] The A-effect, nevertheless, is not devoid of emotions or empathy. The matter comes to be that emotions are instead reconfigured, wherein the spectator is free to experience different emotions from the characters; as Brecht explains, “[the spectator] can experience anger when the character on stage experiences joy.”[34] Hence, the actor is still allowed to run the gamut of emotions, given consideration of his character’s situation, of course.
Brecht’s other principal acting technique is the Gestus. Gestus is best understood as “a physical action or spatial configuration which reveals the ideological, social and economic relations between two or more characters.”[35] Thus, it is very much reliant on symbolism and allegory, as Bradley explains that in scene 6 of Brecht’s 1951 production of The Mother (Die Mutter), the tableau configuration of the teacher standing under the Tsar’s portrait while declaring that it would be senseless to educate the masses tenably exposed the Russian education system as a mouthpiece for the Tsar’s ideology and a hindrance to political change.[36] As a physical action, the gestus takes the form of bodily gestures and actions; these are meant to be expansive and are not psychologically connected to the character.[37] Krause notes that this in stark contrast to the Method, whereby actors are trained to work ‘from the inside out’; “waiting for [a] physical movement to be inspired by a psychological impetus, thereby ensuring a [subdued] lifelike result.”[38] Brecht offers a warning: “expressions of a gest are usually highly complicated and contradictory… the actor must take care that in giving his image the necessary emphasis he does not lose anything, but [emphasises] the entire complex.”[39]
As mentioned, Brecht’s topography of the self is of Marxian provenance. Brecht’s self is characterised by a conscious and a subconscious mind, with both being susceptible to social indoctrination, particularly the latter. The self is shaped by a diverse set of macrocosmic/institutional forces (politics, economics, religion, culture, history, etc.) that seem ‘given’, but man is capable of waking himself up from them and changing these (man-made) conditions. This aspect is reminiscent of a Western topography as it implies that the self is layered, with different institutional forces affecting different layers. As a Marxist, Brecht used epic theatre to highlight the ways in which the bourgeois oppressed the proletariat, but such a tool could equally be used to reveal the constitutions of race or gender.[40] Brecht ultimately saw the self in close relation to its environment, changeable insofar as society’s institutions change too.
Method’s topography, although also conceivably Western, is expressed differently. According to Group Theatre founder/director Harold Clurman, Method acting is a “means of training actors as well as a technique for the use of actors in their work on parts.”[41] Like Stanislavsky’s system, from which it’s derived, Method is best understood as a “procedure, not a series of rules to be applied specifically.”[42] The aim of this acting theory is to enable actors to create realistic and truthful behaviour in imaginary circumstances, as Krasner notes, “it trains the actor to make demands on the body through the use of stimuli and imagination, so that the body responds creatively.”[43] The process, through which the actor acquires this, as Lee Strasberg explains, is via “work in two spheres – the actor’s work on himself and the actor’s work on the role.”[44][45] Counsell, however, argues that the notion of a performance being ‘realistic’ is not an inherent feature of the actual performance, but rather derived from the way it’s received; realistic acting is the mode deemed realistic by its viewing culture, its innate artificiality comes to signify the ‘real’.[46][47] Robert Lewis notes that real behaviour on stage must be “really experienced, but artistically controlled, and correctly used for the particular character portrayed, the complete circumstances of the scene, and the chosen style of the author and play being performed.” Counsell develops this contention to its logical conclusion and argues that although certain (Hollywood) practitioners may perceive the Method as a ‘self-evident’ way to act, it is essentially just another acting style with its own iconography (repertoire of movements, postures, speech, etc), and ultimately actors draw from this pool of performance signs when they perform.
Method acting, in drawing on the actor’s life, past experiences, emotions and, even, personal traumas, implies that the self is a repository of memories; a deep and complex psychological being that is able to generate layers of meaning in an acting or non-acting performance, which lie beyond easy comprehension.[48] This also indicates that there is both an inner and an outer appearance or incarnation of the self. Strasberg’s private moment/affect memory exercise requires actors to tap into their repository, as they use personal stimuli to recall physical sensations, which then transfigure into a sensory image.[49] This sensory image subsequently motivates associated emotions and physical actions. The aim is to strengthen the links between sensory images and emotions, so that the actor is able to respond creatively on stage.[50][51] Moreover, the understanding of the self as a complex psychological being has resulted in the Method’s consideration of subtext and the employment of improvisation. From improvising, the actor builds a detailed inner life for the character, one that is sovereign from the play. This is divergent from Stanislavsky, whose characters are created to satisfy the play’s requirements, whereas in the Method, they are constructed despite those requirements, whereby the character’s internal reality takes precedence over the play.
Charles Marowitz writes that Method acting “encourages the actor to approach a role as if it were an invitation to reveal himself.”[52] This is related to both Stanislavsky’s concept of ‘perezhivanie’: of ‘experiencing’ and ‘living through’ the role, and Stella Adler’s acting ‘from yourself’ idea, where, after defining the difference between his behaviours and the character’s, the actor acts without thinking where his personal action ends and the character’s begins.[53][54] Krasner elucidates: “Authenticity appeals to the inner life construed as an expression or state of the self, offering physical and psychological understanding of identity. [And although] the social world may compel self-awareness of our class, gender, race, and/or ethnicity … the alleged true self is thought of as independent of the social world.”[55] Similar to Brecht’s topography, this ‘self’ is layered, with different institutional forces (i.e. economics, gender, race, etc) shaping different layers. These forces may also coerce humans to identify with a singular aspect of their identity (such as race) over and above the self’s totality. There’s also an allusion to the ‘true self’, the primordial somatic side of the self that’s independent of social constructs and labels and which resides at the bottom of these layers. This ‘true self’ seems to be a-cultural, responding only to instincts and impulses. There emerges here, this requirement of transformation, of behaviour on stage as being “really experienced.” The Method clearly rejects indicating and external imitation, something that Brecht contrastingly promoted in his acting approach. This notion of authentic behaviour on stage can be seen as originating from the American cultural value of authenticity. This value stemmed from America’s struggle to define its national identity at the fin-de-siècle and undoubtedly has affected Method’s topography of the self.
Method’s reliance on the self has attracted much criticism, however, these criticisms are fallacies in that they fail to fully realise the topography of the self that underlies this acting theory. One such is Brustein, who criticises Method actors for their seemingly lack of versatility; because of their interests in the self and themselves, Method actors “usually purvey a single character from role to role, one that is recognisably close to his own personality.”[56] Krasner refutes this claim and argues that the Method’s ‘self’ is “neither static nor fixed, but evolving … human beings reinvent themselves continuously. The self changes by entering into new relationships, and the actor must bring new ideas to each successive characterisation.”[57] Moreover, it also implies that there are different sides to a person. Hence, the actor is more than allowed to focus on himself when working on a new role, and this is not at the risk of perpetuating a fixed characterisation. Subsequently, this demonstrates the necessity of understanding the acting theory’s topography of the self prior to applying the acting techniques.
In conclusion, this essay has described two approaches to acting: Brecht’s Epic performance and the American Method, and attempted to map out the distinct implicit theories or topographies of the self that seemingly pervade and underlie each approach. In doing so, it first explored the theoretical premise by which acting has come to be thought of as being informed by a version of ‘the self’, borrowing namely from Auslander, Appadurai and Zarrilli. Both Brecht’s and the Method’s theories of the self are comparable with a Western topography of the self, though expressed and emphasised differently. Both see ‘the self’ as being layered, with macrocosmic/ institutional forces affecting the individual’s understanding of it. Brecht saw these forces of economics, politics and religion as changeable; in fact, of them needing to be changed as often they’re used by men to oppress other men. Method acting concurs with this understanding, but asserts that the ‘true self’ is independent of these socio-cultural constructs/labels; that although different layers of the self (e.g. class, gender, race, etc) come to affect one’s identity, there still remains an incorruptible, universal primordial self. In contrast, Brecht believes the self, or rather both the conscious and subconscious mind of the self to be extremely susceptible to the social world. Method also theorises the self in terms of the mind, in that it perceives the self to be a repository of memories – a deep and complex psychological being. These ideas of the self have undoubtedly informed the content of their respective acting theories and, more often than not, an appreciation of this topography is necessary prior to the application and appropriation of the acting theory.
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Auslander, Philip. ‘“Just Be Yourself”: Logocentricism and Difference in Performance Theory’. Phillip B. Zarrilli (ed.)’s Acting (Re)Considered: Theories and Practice. London and New York: Routledge. 1995.
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Counsell, Colin. Signs of Performance: An Introduction to Twentieth-Century Theatre. New York: Routledge. 1996.
Eddershaw, Margaret. Performing Brecht: Forty Years of British Performance. London and New York: Routledge. 1996.
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Krause, Duane. ‘An Epic System’. Phillip B. Zarrilli (ed.)’s Acting (Re)Considered: Theories and Practice. London and New York: Routledge. 1995.
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Roach, Joseph R. ‘Preface’. The Player’s Passion: Studies in the Science of Acting. Newark: University of Delaware Press. 1985.
Rouse, John. ‘Brecht and the Contradictory Actor’. Phillip B. Zarrilli (ed.)’s Acting (Re)Considered: Theories and Practice. London and New York: Routledge. 1995.
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[1] Philip Auslander, ‘“Just Be Yourself”: Logocentricism and Difference in Performance Theory’, in Phillip B. Zarrilli (ed.)’s Acting (Re)Considered: Theories and Practice, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, p. 59.
[2] Philip Auslander, ibid.
[3] Joseph R. Roach, ‘Preface’, The Player’s Passion: Studies in the Science of Acting, Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1985, p. 16.
Phillip B. Zarrilli, Acting (Re)Considered: Theories and Practice, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, p. 8.
[4] Phillip B. Zarrilli, p. 1.
[5] Phillip B. Zarrilli, p. 10.
[6] Logos = Logocentrism: the orientation of philosophy toward an order of meaning – thought, truth, reason, logic, the World – conceived as existing in itself, as foundation.
[7] Philip Auslander, p. 60.
[8] Philip Auslander, ibid.
[9] Philip Auslander, ibid.
[10] Arjun Appadurai, ‘Topographies of the Self: Praise and Emotion in Hindu India’, in Catherine A. Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod (ed.)’s Language and the Politics of Emotion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1990, p. 92.
[11] Arjun Appadurai, p. 92-93.
[12] Arjun Appadurai, p. 93.
[13] Phillip B. Zarrilli, p. 1.
[14] Phillip B. Zarrilli, p. 2.
[15] John Rouse, ‘Brecht and the Contradictory Actor’, in Phillip B. Zarrilli (ed.)’s Acting (Re)Considered: Theories and Practice, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, p. 229-230.
[16] John Rouse, p. 230.
[17] John Rouse, ibid.
[18] Duane Krause, ‘An Epic System’, in Phillip B. Zarrilli (ed.)’s Acting (Re)Considered: Theories and Practice, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, p. 262.
[19] Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, John Willet (ed.), New York: Hill and Wang, 1964, p. 86.
[20] Margaret Eddershaw, Performing Brecht: Forty Years of British Performance, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 2.
[21] Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, John Willet (ed.), New York: Hill and Wang, 1964, p. 136.
[22] John Rouse, p. 231.
[23] Bertolt Brecht, p. 136.
[24] Laura Bradley, Brecht and Political Theatre: The Mother on Stage, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 5.
[25] John Rouse, p. 230.
[26] John Rouse, ibid.
[27] Bertolt Brecht, p. 92.
[28] Laura Bradley, p. 6.
[29] Laura Bradley, p. 5.
[30] Bertolt Brecht, p. 138.
[31] Laura Bradley, p. 4.
[32] Shomit Mitter, Systems of Rehearsal: Stanislavsky, Brecht, Grotowski and Brook, London and New York: Routledge, 1992, p. 42-43.
[33] Shomit Mitter, p. 43.
[34] Laura Bradley, p. 7.
[35] Laura Bradley, p. 6.
[36] Laura Bradley, p. 5-6.
[37] Duane Krause, p. 268.
[38] Duane Krause, ibid.
[39] Bertolt Brecht, p. 198.
[40] Duane Krause, p. 265.
[41] Harold Clurman, The Collected Works of Harold Clurman, Marjorie Loggia and Glen Young (ed.), New York: Applause, 1994, p. 369.
[42] David Krasner [A], ‘Strasberg, Adler and Meisner: Method Acting’, in Alison Hodge (ed.)’s Twentieth Century Actor Training, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 134.
[43] David Krasner [B], ‘I Hate Strasberg’, in David Krasner (ed.)’s Method Acting Reconsidered: Theory, Practice, Future, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000, p. 5.
[44] David Krasner [B], p. 4.
[45] Robert Lewis, Method or Madness?, New York: Samuel French, 1958, p. 99.
[46] Colin Counsell, Signs of Performance: An Introduction to Twentieth-Century Theatre, New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 53.
[47] Colin Counsell, ibid.
[48] David Krasner [A], p. 130.
[49] David Krasner [B], p. 12.
[50] David Krasner [B], p. 19.
[51] David Krasner [B], p. 16.
[52] Charles Marowitz, Stanislavsky and the Method, New York: Citadel, 1964, p. 43.
[53] David Krasner [B], p. 4-5.
[54] David Krasner [B], p. 25.
[55] David Krasner [B], p. 27.
[56] David Krasner [A], p. 132.
[57] David Krasner, ibid.
